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11 Introduction
Evaluating what parents spend on children is an essential prerequisite for inferring in-
dividual living standards from income data. Among the numerous methods suggested
in the economic literature to measure the cost of children, the Rothbarth method
is certainly one of the most theoretically sound. It consists in imputing the same
level of aggregate consumption, whatever the demographic composition of the house-
hold in which they live, to adults that have the same level of consumption of some
adult-speci￿c goods, and deriving from this the fraction of household total expendi-
ture devoted to children.1 To ￿x ideas, let us illustrate this method with the simple
speci￿cation proposed by Gronau (1988, 1991). The goods are supposed to be private
(i.e., consumption is rival). First we denote the quantity of adult-speci￿c goods pur-
chased by the household by qa, the total expenditure of the household by X, and the
expenditure speci￿cally devoted to children by ￿. The expenditure devoted to adults
is thus equal to X ￿￿. Then we suppose that the demand for adult-speci￿c goods in
a household with children is represented by the following linear equation:




where A and B are parameters. Thus the children in the household have a simple
wealth e⁄ect on the demand for adult-speci￿c goods that translates the resources
available for the adults by ￿. Information on the level of total expenditure of the
household and on the quantity of adult-speci￿c goods purchased can be obtained
from usual consumer expenditure surveys. The fundamental identifying idea of the
Rothbarth-Gronau method is that the parameters A and B, which are crucial to
recover the cost of children, are the same whatever the demographic composition of
the household. In other words, the demand for adult-speci￿c goods in a household
without children is simply given by:
qa = A + BX: (2)
The parameters of this equation can thus be estimated from a sample of childless
adults, allowing one to identify the cost of children (1).
1See Deaton, Ruiz-Castillo and Thomas (1989), Gronau (1991) and Lazear and Michael (1988)
on the Rothbarth approach. See Browning (1992) and Lewbel (1997) for a survey of the various
techniques used to measure the cost of children.
2This method is remarkably simple. Needless to say, however, the identifying assump-
tion, according to which the parameters A and B are independent of the demographic
composition of the household, is questionable. In fact we can distinguish at least two
serious problems that might invalidate the estimations obtained with this method.
Firstly, the existence of economies of scale, due in particular to the possibility of
joint consumption in multi-person households, may generate a wealth e⁄ect that will
generally modify the structure of consumption.2 Perhaps more importantly, scale
economies may a⁄ect the consumption of adults￿goods not only via a wealth e⁄ect
but also via substitution e⁄ects. For instance, adult-speci￿c goods which are typi-
cally private goods may appear as more costly in a multi-person household than other
goods with a large public component (such as heating).3 Secondly, another impor-
tant problem that may a⁄ect the validity of the Rothbarth method is concerned with
the lack of individualistic foundations. The adults of the household are described by
some constant parameters A and B (in the example above), the provenance of which
is unknown. However, recent literature on collective models suggests that individu-
als in households, in particular, men and women, may di⁄er in terms of objectives.4
Hence the decisions are often the result of a compromise ￿which may be a⁄ected by
the presence of children ￿among household members. More generally, the notion of
distribution factors, i.e., variables that a⁄ect the within-household bargaining without
in￿ uencing preferences or the budget constraint (according to the traditional termi-
nology of Bourguignon, Browning, and Chiappori, 2008), is potentially important to
explain the level of the parents￿expenditure devoted to children.5 Finally, to under-
2If adult-speci￿c goods are necessary (luxury), the budget share for adult-speci￿c goods will de-
crease (increase) with economies of scale so that the cost of children will be overstated (understated)
by the econometrician. This mechanism is explained in greater detail in the core of the paper.
3Another traditional argument is that goods that are consumed by both adults and children become
more expensive to the adult than goods that are only consumed by adults (Deaton and Muellbauer,
1986). To quote Deaton (1997): ￿on a visit to a restaurant, the father who prefers a soft drink and
who would order it were he alone, ￿nds that in the company of a child his soft drink is twice as
expensive but that a beer costs the same, and so is encouraged to substitute towards the latter￿ .
4See Chiappori and Donni (2010) and Donni (2008) for a survey of this literature.
5For instance, a shift of the bargaining power from the father to the mother (due, say, to an
exogenous modi￿cation of their respective earnings) may change the expenditure devoted to children.
3stand boy-girl discrimination (Deaton, 1989; Rose, 1999), it is necessary to be able to
disentangle the mother￿ s and the father￿ s preferences in an equation such as (2).
In the present paper, we suggest a variation of the Rothbarth method which is con-
sistent with economies of scale and with parental bargaining. Our approach is closely
related to the most recent developments of the literature on collective models.6 In
particular, Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2008) and Lewbel and Pendakur (2008)
consider a model where each individual is characterized by a speci￿c utility function
and suggest the complete identi￿cation of (a) the sharing rule of household resources
(which summarizes the bargaining process) and (b) the economies of scale, exploiting
simultaneously data on couples and single-person households. Browning, Chiappori
and Lewbel (2008) account for economies of scale using a (price) transformation ￿
la Barten while Lewbel and Pendakur (2008) adopt an independence of base tech-
nology of production, i.e., they suppose that there exists a single function, which is
independent of total expenditure, that scales the expenditure of each individual in
the household and represents the economies from joint consumption. While these au-
thors focus on childless couples, we extend the approach to families with children. To
represent economies of scale, we follow Lewbel and Pendakur (2008) and make the
independence of base assumption. This assumption allows us to recover the sharing of
resources between wife, husband and children as well as the consumption technology
without price variation, which makes the estimation much more tractable and is also
very convenient when using data in which spatial or time variation in prices is limited.
In line with the traditional Rothbarth method, we also suppose that the demand for
some adult-speci￿c goods is observed. Actually each adult in the household must ex-
clusively consume at least one adult-speci￿c good. This is slightly more demanding
To come back to our example, the parameters A and B for households with and without children
have not to be the same.
6In the traditional literature on collective models, children and their implications for the intra-
household allocation are generally ignored: empirical estimations are carried out using a sample
of childless couples (Chiappori and Browning, 1998; Donni, 2009). We are aware of essentially
two studies (Blundell, Chiappori and Meghir, 2005; Bourguignon, 1999) on collective models that
explicitly deal with young children. Closely related are the papers of Menon and Perali (2007) and
the test of Dauphin et al. (2008) on collective models with more than two deciders.
4than in the traditional Rothbarth approach. From economies of scale and the sharing
of resources, we can compute indi⁄erence scales, that is, the scalar by which household
expenditure must be multiplied so that adults living in couple (with or without chil-
dren) have the same level of welfare as adults living alone (Lewbel, 2003; Browning,
Chiappori and Lewbel, 2008; Lewbel and Pendakur, 2008). We can also propose a
new measure for the cost of children which takes into account economies of scale.7
Our theoretical results are implemented using the 2000 French Household Budget
Survey (INSEE). We suppose that household expenditures on certain pieces of clothing
can be seen as adult-speci￿c and consider the case of couples with only one child. We
￿rst estimate the budget share equations for the two adult-speci￿c goods in order to
measure the cost of children and the economies of scale, then generalize our approach
and estimate a system of ten budget share equations. Our evaluation of what parents
spend for the child is comprised between 20% and 27% of the total expenditure of
the household, which is much more conform to intuition than evaluations based on
the traditional Rothbarth method. Once economies of scale are taken into account, it
turns out that the cost is notably lower.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model and demon-
strate how it can be identi￿ed. In Section 3, we present the functional form and the
method of estimation. In Section 4, we present the data and report the results. In
Section 5, we conclude. Further theoretical results are given in the Appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 Preferences, Technologies and the Decision Process
We consider three types of households, namely, a single individual (n = 1), a couple
without children (n = 2) and a couple with one child (n = 3) that make decisions about
consumption. Individuals are indexed by subscript i while superscript k = 1;:::;K
7The present paper must also be related to the recent contribution made, independently of ours, by
Dunbar, Lewbel and Pendakur (2010). These authors suggest an alternative, interesting identi￿cation
strategy of individual shares of total expenditure using only data on couples with children, but they
do not propose a measure of child costs taking account of economies of scale.
5denotes goods. By convention, we suppose that i = 1 is a male adult, i = 2 is a female
adult and i = 3 is a child. The log total expenditure in a household is denoted by x
and the vector of log prices by p.
In a single-person household (n = 1), individual utility is maximized with respect to a
budget constraint. The indirect utility function of a single individual i endowed with
log resources x is supposed to be well-behaved (monotonic, strictly quasi-convex, and
twice-continuously di⁄erentiable) and is denoted by vi(x;p;zi), where zi is a vector of
individual characteristics for individual i (such as age, education, region of residence);
hence, the budget share of individual i for good k is de￿ned by
w
k




for i = 1;2;3 and k = 1;:::;K.
In a multi-person household (n > 1), however, budget share equations will change in a
way that re￿ ects (a) scale economies and (b) total expenditure sharing. More precisely,
each individual in the household is characterized by a well-behaved utility function,
the same as that of a similar single individual (that is, single and married persons
have identical preferences over goods if they have the same individual characteristics).
The relative allocation of household resources exp(x) among the household members is
then de￿ned according to some arbitrary rule, which may be seen as the outcome of an
unspeci￿ed decision process.8 That is to say, individual i living in household of type
n > 1 receives a share ￿i;n(x;p;z) of total expenditure exp(x). The sharing functions
￿i;n(x;p;z), with i = 1;:::;n and n = 2 and 3, are di⁄erentiable, comprised between
zero and one, and sum up to unity, i.e.,
Pn
i=1 ￿i;n(x;p;z) = 1. They, in general,
depend on prices and total expenditure.9 They also depend on a vector of household
characteristics z; the latter includes individual characteristics zi with i = 1;:::;n as
well as some speci￿c variables ￿ z that govern the intrahousehold allocation of resources
(i.e., distribution factors). An interesting candidate for these variables is the ratio of
8In the collective framework, the existence of a ￿rst stage sharing of total expenditure can be
justi￿ed by the sole e¢ ciency assumption. The sharing may also be the result of parents￿altruism.
9For instance, we can imagine that the resources accruing to the child vary with the price of child
goods (such as child￿ s clothing or toys); see also Bargain and Donni (2008) on this point.
6spouses￿exogenous incomes in as much as the household bargaining power of spouses
depends on what they earn.10
To obtain our main results regarding identi￿cation, we also adopt the same assumption
as Lewbel and Pendakur (2008) and Dunbar, Lewbel and Pendakur (2010), that is:
A.1. The shares of total expenditure are di⁄erentiable functions that do not depend
on total expenditure x, that is, ￿i;n(x;p;z) = ￿i;n(p;z) for i = 1;2;3 and n = 2;3.
This assumption is potentially strong but it is made essentially for the sake of sim-
plicity. Indeed we show in the Appendix that the main identi￿cation results still hold,
theoretically at least, when sharing functions depend on total expenditure. Yet, as
explained, its implementation with real data may be di¢ cult. Our objective here is to
keep the empirical model simple and tractable at the expense of reasonable approx-
imations. Moreover, this assumption is attractive as it implies, as explained below,
that the scales we develop in this paper are independent of the base, a desirable prop-
erty which is often imposed in the traditional equivalence scales literature. Finally,
this assumption can be mitigated in empirical applications by including measures of
household wealth other than total expenditure in income shares.
The publicness of goods, and hence economies of scale in the household, are repre-
sented by a particular technology of production. This technology must be su¢ ciently
tractable so that the model can be estimated using cross-section data. The simplest,
but not most convincing, framework to model economies of scale consists in using En-
gel scales. With A.1, the indirect utility function of individual i in household of type
n then becomes: vi(p;x+log￿i;n(p;z)￿logse;zi), where se < 1 is an Engel scale. So,
the "value" of total expenditure is in￿ ated by the presence of several persons in the
household and economies of scale have a pure wealth e⁄ect. This is the case envisaged
in the introduction.11 However, this approach is not satisfactory because, as it seems
obvious, the level of joint consumption is not the same for all goods: some goods have
a clear public component while other goods are completely private. Moreover, the pro-
10Numerous studies indeed show that the source of exogenous income in￿ uences the structure of
consumption. For instance, Thomas (1991) note that unearned income in the hands of the mother
has a bigger e⁄ect on the children￿ s health.
11In our previous example and with Engel scales, the demand for adult goods in a household with
7portion of jointly consumed goods will generally not be the same for all the household
members. To give the intuition, let us consider a couple with or without child and
suppose that a constant proportion of all the goods, say #, is consumed jointly within
the household. In that case, the consumption of spouse i in household of type n > 1
is supplemented by a fraction of joint consumption of the other household members;
it is equal to



















so that, even in this very simple case, the de￿ ator representing economies of scale will
depend on the vector of prices (at least if the sharing of total expenditure depends itself
on the vector of prices). Therefore we decided to adopt a much more general approach
than Engel scales and the scales such as (4), and to assume that economies of scale
generated by joint consumption of certain goods in the household can be represented
by a price-dependent de￿ ator. We ￿rst introduce this assumption formally below and
then discuss its implications.
A.2. (Independent of the Base) For each person i living in a household of type
n > 1, we assume that there exists a scalar-valued, di⁄erentiable function si;n(p;z)
such that the indi⁄erence curves of individual i satisfy the condition:
ui = vi(p;x + log￿i;n(p;z) ￿ logsi;n(p;z);zi) (5)
for any level of log individual expenditure x + log￿i;n(p;z).
children is given by:











This expression underlines the distortions that may result from the omission of scale economies when
using the Rothbarth method. Speci￿cally, assuming that B > 0 and se < 1, the cost of children will
be over-stated if the adult good is necessary (A > 0) and under-stated if it is luxury (A < 0).
8The de￿ ator measures the cost savings experienced by person i resulting from scale
economies in the household. The Independent of the base (IB) assumption refers to
the fact that these economies are assumed to be independent of the base expenditure
(and hence utility) level at which they are evaluated. This assumption is similar to
the IB restriction in the equivalence scale literature (Blackorby and Donaldson, 1993;
Lewbel, 1989, 1991), but it concerns individual utility functions rather than aggregated
household utility functions.12 The scaling function si;n(p;z) can be interpreted by ￿rst
discerning two polar cases: if si;n(p;z) = 1 for i ￿ n, it is as if all the goods were
purely private and if si;n(p;z) = ￿i;n(p;z) for i ￿ n, all the goods can be seen as
purely public. Then a large range of intermediate situations can be obtained for other
values of si;n(p;z).
The fact that the scaling function depends on prices makes the IB scale far more general
than traditional Engel scales; in particular, the idea that some goods are consumed
in common (and thereby largely a⁄ected by economies of scale) while other goods are
not can be represented here, admittedly in a quite restrictive way, by the derivative
of si;n(p;z) with respect to prices. To take an intuitive example, let us suppose that
good k has a large public component (like housing) so that it can potentially generate
important economies of scale. Of course, the actual economies will depend on the
quantity of good k purchased by the household. Then an increase in the price of good
k that leads to a reduction of the purchased quantity of good k will have a positive
e⁄ect on the scale si;n(p;z) (i.e., a negative e⁄ect on economies of scale). Conversely,
let us suppose that good k is purely private (like food). Then an increase in the price
of good k will have a negative e⁄ect on the scale si;n(p;z). Moreover, economies of
scale may di⁄er between individuals within the same household, depending on how
they value the good which is jointly consumed. In particular, if the consumption by
member i of good k exerts a negative externality e⁄ect on the utility of the other
members in the same household, and if member i internalizes this e⁄ect in his/her
12The scaling function si;n(p;z) generally depends on all the individual characteristics of the per-
sons living in the household, z. Indeed, it cannot be excluded that the extent of joint consumption
of one person in the household be related to the characteristics of his/her partner or his/her child.
It seems logical, however, to suppose that distribution factors do not enter scale economies because
they in￿ uence behavior only via the intra-household distribution of total expenditure. This is not
important for our results, though.
9utility function, then a decrease in the price of this good may be compensated by an
increase of the scale si;n(p;z). This ￿ exibility of IB scales is particularly important.
The apparition of a child in the household may indeed generate important externality
e⁄ects; for example, the parents may decide to stop smoking and to change their leisure
activities. Note ￿nally that IB scales can be seen as an approximation of Barten scales
(used by Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel, 2008) in the sense that indirect utility
functions can be both IB and Barten scaled if at least one linear restriction exists on
the log of Barten scales (Lewbel, 1991). For a more structural presentation of the
model using Barten scales, the reader is referred to Lewbel and Pendakur (2008).
2.2 Economies of Scale, Indi⁄erence Scales and the Cost of
Children
From the above discussion, it is clear that the level of the scale si;n(p;z) cannot be
interpreted directly: it must be compared to the level of the corresponding share
￿i;n(p;z). Fortunately, a normalized indicator of the ￿ individual￿economies of scale
for each member can be de￿ned as






for n ￿ 2, which is equal to 1 in the purely private case and to 2 in the purely public
case. If the scale is of the form (4), then ￿i;n(p;z) is simply equal to 1 + #.
Denote logIi;n(p;z) = logsi;n(p;z) ￿ log￿i;n(p;z) so that equation (5) can be com-
pactly written as:
ui = vi(p;x ￿ logIi;n(p;z);zi): (6)
The term Ii;n(p;z) is the indi⁄erence scale of member i as de￿ned by Lewbel (2003),
Lewbel and Pendakur (2009) and Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2008). It rep-
resents the income adjustment applied to person i when living in a multi-person
household ￿consuming a share ￿i;n(p;z) of total resources and bene￿ting from scale
economies represented by si;n(p;z) ￿for her/him to reach the same indi⁄erence curve
as when living alone.13 This concept di⁄ers from an ordinary equivalence scale, which
13The de￿nition at stake here is slightly di⁄erent from that found in the mentioned literature
because the basis of reference is the single person and not the person living in a couple.
10attempts to compare the welfare of an individual to that of a household, and hence
su⁄ers from the fundamental identi￿cation problem associated with interpersonal com-
parisons (Pollak and Wales, 1979, 1992). In contrast, indi⁄erence scales can be seen
as comparing the same individual in two di⁄erent situations: living alone and living
with a partner (with or without children).14 Implicitly, the direct utility or disutility
from living with others (such as love and companionship) is assumed to be separable
from consumption goods and ignored.
The notion of indi⁄erence scale leads to a new measure for the cost of children. The
scalar by which the total expenditure of a childless couple must be multiplied so that








and the cost of the child as a fraction of total expenditure is:
c(p;z) = ￿(p;z) ￿ 1:
This measure recognizes the role of economies of scale when estimating the cost of
children. It is the concept that is relevant for policy recommendations. For instance,
let us suppose the government wants to compensate couples for the birth of their ￿rst
child; it must give child bene￿ts that are equal to c(p;z) ￿ expx for some level x
of log total expenditure. To distinguish this cost from more traditional measures of
the cost of children and to underline the fact that it incorporates economies of scale,
we shall refer to it as ￿the overall cost￿in what follows. Note that this measure is
proportionate to total expenditure. In fact, as it was anticipated, indi⁄erence scales
Ii;n(p;z), normalized economies of scale ￿i;n(p;z), and the overall cost of the child
c(p;z) are independent of the base.
14It is fair to say that traditional equivalence scales are sometimes interpreted as comparing the
utility of the sole adults in the household, and not the utility of the household as a whole (Nelson,
1993). However, this interpretation is not convincing in the unitary framework.
112.3 The Budget Shares of Total Expenditure
Denoting the log individual share as xi;n = x + log￿i;n and applying Roy￿ s identity to










where the left-hand side of this expression is the fraction of member i￿ s resource share,














is the elasticity of si;n(p;z) with respect to the k-th price. The consequence of the
IB assumption in the present context is that the budget share equations of person i
when living in a household di⁄er from when alone only in that they are translated over
by dk
i;n(p;z) while log household expenditures x are translated over by logIi;n(p;z).
This property is referred to as "shape invariance" by Pendakur (1999). The trans-
lation function dk
i(p;z) is speci￿c to good k and related to the di⁄erences that may
exist between goods with respect to the possibility of joint consumption. Intuitively,
economies of scale may have a wealth e⁄ect and a substitution e⁄ect. The former
is represented by logsi;n(p;z) and the latter by dk
i;n(p;z). The substitution e⁄ect is
positive (negative) if good k is essentially public (private).
To unify our notation, we also use the following de￿nitions.
N.1. For single men (i = 1) or single women (i = 2), we have: ￿i;1(p;z) = 1,
dk
i;1(p;z) = 0, si;1(p;z) = 1 for any k.
This condition is also a normalization. It implicitly means that single individuals are
used as the demographic structure of reference.
Now let us suppose that data are observed in a unique price regime, as provided in
cross-sectional data, so that the vector of prices p is constant and can be taken out of
equation (7). Formally, the implications of the IB assumption in a framework with no
price variation are described in the following lemma:
12Lemma 1. Assume A.1￿ A.2 and N.1. If prices are constant, the budget share of







i (x ￿ logIi;n(z);zi); (8)
for k = 1;:::;K, i = 1;:::;n, and n = 1;2;3;
where logIi;n(z) = logsi;n(z)￿log￿i;n(z) is the log de￿ ator of total expenditure which
combines the scaling si;n and sharing ￿i;n.
The left-hand side of (8) represents the ￿ reduced-form￿budget share on good k of
person i in household of type n as a function of (log) household resources x and
household characteristics z. The right-hand side puts some structure on the budget
share as a result of the IB restriction. The individual budget share function wk
i (￿;zi)
depends on person i￿ s individual resources adjusted by the scaling si;n(z) and on the
individual characteristics zi (but not on the characteristics of the other individuals in
the household). This share is then translated by the elasticity dk
i;n(z).
For each good k, we can write household expenditure as the sum of individual expen-
ditures on that good. Dividing this identity by total outlay exp(x), we obtain directly





i=1 ￿i;n(z) ￿ !
k
i;n(x;z), (9)
for any n and any k, where W k
n (￿) is the share spent by the household of type n on
good k. This is simply the sum of individual budget share equations over all household
members, weighted by their individual resource shares. Using equation (8), the budget











i (x ￿ logIi;n(z);zi)
￿
; (10)
where individual budget shares are translated both in budget shares and log-expenditure.
2.4 Identi￿cation Strategy
Our goal here is to identify the important structural elements of the model, namely the
sharing and scaling functions, from demand data. To account for unobserved factors,








for n = 1;2;3 and k = 1;:::;K;
where ~ W k
n(￿) is the stochastic extension of W k
n(￿). The classical interpretation of the
error term "k
n is that it represents optimization or measurement errors. This is the
easiest way to understand this speci￿cation. Alternatively, the stochastic component
could be interpreted as resulting from unobservable heterogeneity in the individual
budget share equations (hence assuming random utilities), in the scales or in the






i=1 ￿i;n(z) ￿ "k
i;n, where "k
i;n is an idiosyncratic term for member i in the
household. The discussion that follows is not modi￿ed provided that the terms "k
i;n are
independent of z. Moreover, in that case, the term "k
n will generally be heteroskedastic.
The equations (11) can be identi￿ed from well-known results in non-parametric econo-
metrics provided the sample is su¢ ciently large and error terms satisfy normalization
restrictions (see Matzkin, 2007, for instance). Identi￿cation can thus concentrate on
how to retrieve the structural components si;n(z), and ￿i;n(z), for i = 1;:::;n and
n = 1;2;3, from the knowledge of the deterministic components W k
n(￿).
Identi￿cation exploits the following additional assumption:
A.3. There exists at least one adult-speci￿c good for each adult in the household. More
precisely, one good k1 is consumed by men but not by women or children and one other
good k2 is consumed by women but not by men or children.
The concept of adult-speci￿c goods plays a major role for applying the well-known
Rothbarth method. Classic examples of such goods include certain pieces of clothing,
tobacco and alcohol even if more inclusive de￿nitions have also been used (as explained
by Deaton, 1997). The assumption introduced here is a little more demanding as the
good must be speci￿c to the wife or the husband. We explain in the Appendix how
this restriction could theoretically be relaxed. The extension to the case with a unique
adult-speci￿c good is not presented here because the data we use e⁄ectively contains
a pair of goods that are speci￿c to wives and husbands respectively. Moreover, we
14believe that the identi￿cation of the structural components of the model with only one
adult-speci￿c good may be ￿ imsy in practice.
The identi￿cation result that follows relies on a certain number of normalization condi-
tions. First of all, the condition N.1 previously discussed is obviously necessary. More-
over, the terms that represent economies of scale in the budget share equations of
children are actually meaningless in a world where young children are always living
within the same family structure.15 Hence, without loss of generality, the following
condition is also used.
N.2. For children (i = 3), we have: dk
3;3(z) = 0, s3;3(z) = 0 for any k.
The main result is then summarized in the following proposition.





i 6= 0 almost everywhere for i = 1;2, then the sharing functions ￿i;n(z) and
the scaling functions si;n(z), for i = 1;2;3 and n = 1;2;3, can be identi￿ed from the
estimation of the budget share equations W ki
n (x;z) for the adult-speci￿c goods.
The proof follows in three steps. We ￿rst discuss how to retrieve the "basic" budget
share equations. We then consider identi￿cation in the case of couples without child
and in the case of couples with one child.
Step 1. To retrieve the main structural components of the model, the basic idea
is that di⁄erences between individual consumption as a single or in a multi-person
household are assumed to be due to partially joint consumption, resource sharing and
changes in total resources, but are not attributed to taste di⁄erences. Gronau (1988)
argues that this assumption, as strong as it may be, is essential to make the comparison
of individuals living in di⁄erent households possible. Then, using N.1, we simply have:
W
k
1 (x;z) = w
k
i (x;zi);
for any k, with i = 1;2, and identi￿cation of the functions wk
i (￿) can be obtained from
a sample of single (male and female) individuals.
15It would be useful to account for children￿ s economies of scale if we were considering more diver-
si￿ed family structures such as single-parent families or families with several children.
15Step 2. We now consider the case of a childless couple, that is, n = 2. The household
budget share equation for good ki can be written as:
W
ki






i (x ￿ logIi;2(z);zi)
￿
; (12)
for i = 1, 2, because this good is speci￿c to only one person in the household. The
following reasoning is, in fact, a new demonstration (in a slightly di⁄erent context)
of a result previously obtained by Lewbel and Pendakur (2008). The latter do not
use individual-speci￿c goods for their demonstration, though, but consider a system
of budget share equations and suppose that the household total expenditure can be
zero. To eliminate the function d
ki
i;2(z) from equation (12), we compute the ￿rst order
derivative of this expression with respect to x and obtain:
rxW
ki
2 (x;z) = ￿i;2(z)rxw
ki
i (x ￿ logIi;2(z);zi); (13)
where the left-hand side of this expression is identi￿ed. Di⁄erentiating again this
expression with respect to x we obtain the second order derivative:
rxxW
ki
2 (x;z) = ￿i;2(z)rxxw
k
ii (x ￿ logIi;2(z);zi): (14)










i (x ￿ logIi;2(z);zi)
rxxw
ki
i (x ￿ logIi;2(z);zi)
= ￿
ki
i (x + logIi;2(z);z)
where the left-hand side of the ￿rst equality and the function ￿
ki
i (￿;z) are known from
step 1. This condition uniquely identi￿es the indi⁄erence scales Ii;2(z) for i = 1;2,
provided the function ￿
ki
i (￿) is not periodic in its ￿rst argument ￿a rather natural
requirement. Then, for i = 1;2, identi￿cation of sharing functions ￿i;2(z) follows from
(13) and identi￿cation of translation functions d
ki
i;2(z) from (12). Finally, the scaling
functions si;2(z) can be computed for i = 1;2 from the de￿nition of Ii;2(z).
Step 3. In the case of a couple with one child, the budget share equations for adult
speci￿c goods have exactly the same structure as above:
W
ki






i (x ￿ logIi;3(z);zi)
￿
;
16for i = 1, 2. Hence, identi￿cation of ￿i;3(z), si;3(z) and Ii;3(z) for i = 1;2 is straight-
forward and does not deserve a detailed discussion. The share of total expenditure
devoted to the child can then be obtained as:




while the function s3;3(z) is given by N.2. This completes the proof. ￿
Several important comments are in order.
(a) Identi￿cation necessitates that budget share equations for adult-speci￿c goods
be non-linear in log total expenditure, i.e., the second order derivative of the budget
share equation must be di⁄erent from zero. This is not necessarily a serious issue;
as recognized by Banks, Blundell, and Lewbel (1997), budget share equations are
generally non-linear. Nonetheless, the functional form must be su¢ ciently ￿ exible to
account for this nonlinearity. Moreover, the regularity conditions in Proposition 2 may
be violated for some speci￿c goods and must be checked in a preliminary step of the
empirical analysis. If they are not convincingly satis￿ed in the data, modeling more
budget share equations may be a solution as explained below.
(b) It must be clear that modeling more budget share equations than those for the
two adult goods will generate overidenti￿cation restrictions. In particular, any budget
share equation in a childless couple can be written as:
W
k







i (x ￿ Ii;2(z);zi); (15)










i (￿;zi) can be identi￿ed from estimations made on a sample of single-
person households while the functions ￿i;2(z) and Ii;2(z) are identi￿ed from estimations
of the budget share equations for good k1 and k2, as explained above. The only degree
of freedom is then represented by the function Dk
2(z); in particular, the derivative of
the budget share equation with respect to log total expenditure for an arbitrary good
17k is completely determined by the knowledge of the behavior of single persons and the
structural components recovered from adult-speci￿c goods. Such overidenti￿cation
can, naturally, be used to generate empirical tests. In particular, the slopes rxwk
i
can be estimated for goods k 6= k1;k2 from the sample on childless couples, and
these estimations can then be compared to those obtained from the sample on singles.
Otherwise, overidenti￿cation helps improve the precision of the estimations.16
(c) Many more structural components of the model can generally be identi￿ed, which
is not made explicit in the proposition. In particular, if a complete system of budget
share equations (instead of the sole budget share equations for the adult-speci￿c goods)
is estimated, the functions Dk










i (x ￿ Ii;2(z);zi); (17)
where the left-hand side is identi￿ed. Moreover, under some additional conditions,
i.e., if there exists a distribution factor ￿ z1 (say) that enters the sharing functions as
argument without entering the scaling functions, the functions dk
1;2(z) and dk
2;2(z),










i;2(z) = 0 for i = 1;2. This equation, together with equation (16), can
generically be solved with respect to dk
1;2(z) and dk
2;2(z), which in turn allows recovering
the e⁄ect of all the prices (computed at the current system of prices) on economies of
scale. Finally, although the budget share equations of children cannot, in general, be























i (x ￿ Ii;3(z);zi); (18)
16For the sake of simplicity, the discussion above is not complete. Firstly, the budget share func-
tions for adult-speci￿c goods, taken separately from the other budget share functions, are also over-
identi￿ed. This is explained in the Appendix. Secondly, the budget share functions of a couple with










is an unknown function. Now di⁄erentiating expression (18) with respect to x shows
that the derivative of the budget share equation of the child rxwk
3 can be identi￿ed,
allowing us to determine whether goods consumed by the child are luxury or necessary.




and z3, the budget share equations for couples with child generate overi-
dentifying restrictions (provided that z3 is strictly included in z).
3 Empirical Implementation
3.1 Functional Form
In what follows, we shall discuss the empirical speci￿cation of the complete model
which includes 10 equations. The model with only adult-speci￿c goods, which will
also be estimated, is simply a particular case. For the functional form, we suggest a
parameterization that balances ￿ exibility and empirical tractability. The ￿rst compo-
nent, which appears in the speci￿cation of the di⁄erent demographic groups, is the
"basic" budget share equation. We adopt the following quadratic speci￿cation:
w
k






















; for i = 1;2;3 and k = 1;:::;K;




i and ei;j are parameters. The
parameters are speci￿c to individual type (i.e., are indexed i = 1 for men, i = 2 for
women, i = 3 for children) but do not depend on the demographic type n since the
"basic" budget share equations are the same for single women (men) and for women
(men) living in a couple. The demographic variables enter the speci￿cation both as a
translation of budget share equations and as a translation of log scaled expenditure.
The characteristics entering
P




i;jzj include the same variables plus dummies for car ownership,
19house ownership, urban resident and Paris resident. For children, the characteristics






We now turn to the speci￿cation of the household budget share equations. For single
male and female adults, they coincide with the "basic" budget share equations speci￿ed
above plus an additive error term, that is,
~ W
k
1 (x;z) = w
k
i (x;zi) + "
k
1: (19)


















comprise the individual functions wk
i (￿;zi) as already speci￿ed and three other com-







i=1 exp(￿ ￿i;n +
P
j ￿i;jzj)
, for i = 1;2;3 and n = 2;3;
where ￿ ￿i;n and ￿i;j are parameters. To limit the number of parameters, variables in
P
j ￿i;jzj include the dummies for spouse i￿ s age and education for i = 1;2 or the dum-
mies for gender and age for i = 3 as well as a distribution factor ￿the wage ratio which
is de￿ned as the ratio of wife￿ s over husband￿ s labor earnings expressed in full-time
equivalent ￿but it does not include individual characteristics of the partner.17 Almost
all the parameters are the same whether a child is living or not in the household;
only the constant di⁄ers so that it is possible to measure the e⁄ect of the child on
the distribution of resources between parents. Secondly, the log scaling functions that
translates expenditure within the basic budget shares can be written as:
logsi;n(z) = ￿ ￿i;n +
P
j ￿i;jzj, for i = 1;2 and n = 2;3;
where ￿ ￿i;n and ￿i;j are parameters. The scaling functions can, in principle, vary with
all the variables entering preferences (i.e., zi for i = 1;:::;n). In our speci￿cation,
17Normalization is obviously required. The variables entering exponentials corresponding to the
wife are set to zero if they are also in the exponentials of the husband or the child.
20however, it is restricted to depend only on variables regarding individual i. Moreover,
to limit the number of parameters, only the constant is indexed by the type of family n.
Concretely, variables in
P
j ￿i;jzj include the dummies for age and education of spouse
i if it concerns an adult and the dummies for gender and age if it concerns a child.
Thirdly, the function that translates the basic budget shares dk
i;n(z) is a price elasticity.
Measuring price e⁄ects is generally challenging and it is all the more di¢ cult to capture
their interaction with demographics in any plausible way. Therefore we restrict these
terms to be constant:
d
k
i;n(z) = ￿ d
k
i;n; for i = 1;2; n = 2;3; and k = 1;:::;K:
3.2 Estimation Method
The complete model is estimated by the iterated SURE method. To account for the
likely correlation between the error terms "k
n in each budget share function and the log
total expenditure, each budget share equation is augmented with the ￿ Wu-Hausman￿
residuals ^ ￿
1
n (and possibly ^ ￿
2
n) obtained from reduced-form estimations, speci￿c to
family type n, of x and x2 respectively on all exogenous variables used in the model
plus some excluded instruments (Banks, Blundell and Lewbel, 1997; Blundell and
Robin, 1999, 2000; Smith and Blundell, 1986). For the latter, we choose the inverse of
household disposable income and a fourth order polynomials in its logarithm. Since
budget shares sum up to one, equation for good K is unnecessary. The household
budget share equations for the K ￿ 1 goods and for the three demographic groups
are estimated simultaneously. The error terms are supposed to be uncorrelated across
households but correlated across goods within households. They are supposed to be
homoskedastic for each family type n (and covariance matrices are supposed to be
di⁄erent for single male and female). Observations in the data are indexed by h
and the number of singles, couples without children, and couples with children in the
data is denoted by H1, H2, and H3, respectively. Let Wn;h be the (K ￿ 1) vector of
observed budget shares for the ￿rst K ￿ 1 goods consumed by household h of type
n and let ^ Wn;h(￿) be the corresponding (K ￿ 1) vector of predicted budget shares
for some parameter vector ￿. The vector of residuals is thus given by "n;h(￿) =
Wn;h￿ ^ Wn;h(￿). If ^ "n;h = "n;h(^ ￿0), where ^ ￿0 is any initial consistent estimation of the
21vector of parameters, the estimated covariance matrix can be de￿ned by
^ Vn = H
￿1
n ￿ (^ "n;h)(^ "n;h)
0 :









which gives a new value ^ ￿1 for the estimates. The estimation procedure is then iterated
with the new estimates until the covariance matrix converges.
4 Data and Empirical Results
4.1 Data and Sample Selection
Our sample is drawn from the 2000 French Household Budget Survey conducted by
INSEE. This data gathers information on household expenditures, incomes and socio-
demographics for 10;350 representative households. It was collected over the year 2000
and only little price variation is witnessed over this period so that the sample can be
treated as cross-sectional data. All household members who are at least 14 years of
age are interviewed. Expenditures on clothing are recorded for the past two months,
and consumption of daily services and goods are recorded in diaries over the 14 days
of the study.
Our selection criterion is as follows. To begin with, we exclude households larger
than the nucleus family (parents, children), with more than one child or where the
child is aged 14 or more (and hence not di⁄erentiable from adults in terms of clothing
expenditure in the data), which leaves out about 38% of the sample. We then select
households where adults are aged 18-59, which further restricts the initial sample
by 26% and we withdraw another 2% corresponding to households where adults are
students, in the army or retired. Since leisure is not modeled here, but is likely
endogenous to consumption (and savings) decisions, we ￿nally restrict our sample to
working adults and full-time working men. This excludes another 13% of the original
sample, 7% of which is due to non-participating spouses in couples. The ￿nal sample
is composed of 2;153 observations and is described in Table 1.
22In the estimation of the more general model, we use K = 10 non-durable commodities:
food (in and out), "vices" (alcohol, tobacco and gambling), male, female and child
clothing, transport, leisure, household operation, personal goods and services, and
housing (the omitted good in the Engel curve system).18 Formally, one male-speci￿c
good and one female-speci￿c good (and a residual good) are just what we need to
identify the main components of the model. The ￿rst results we present are based
on this simpli￿ed setup. However, we consider eight additional goods to improve the
e¢ ciency of the estimations. We also suppose that expenditures on vice goods are
adult-speci￿c while expenditures on child clothing are child-speci￿c.
4.2 An Informal Look at the Data
The descriptive statistics in Table 1 provide a ￿rst overview of the problems we have
to address. For one time, let us adopt the traditional Rothbarth way of thinking. If
we consider adult-speci￿c goods, we note that the presence of one child reduces the
household budget shares devoted to parents￿clothing. Expenditures in absolute terms
also decrease. For instance, while the average yearly expenditure on male (female)
clothing is 613e (766e) in childless couples, it drops to 570e (647e) in couples with
one child. The Rothbarth intuition then suggests that, on average, the welfare the par-
ents get out of consumption (at least) declines when the household becomes larger (in
spite of a conjoined increase in household total expenditure). The decline in parents￿
welfare is due to the fraction of total expenditure the parents devote to children.
Yet, the story is not complete. In general, the budget share of all the typically private
goods (i.e., food, total clothing and, to some extent, personal goods and services)
increases with the size of the household while the budget share of typically public
goods (i.e., housing) decreases. The decrease in the budget share devoted to housing
when the household size increases is consistent with a reduction of the household living
standard only if housing is a luxury good, which is certainly not the case. The simplest
interpretation is that economies of scale are substantial, and that these economies of
18Traditionally, expenditures on housing are not modeled (because these expenditures may be
di¢ cult to evaluate for owners). Nonetheless, we believe that expenditure on housing cannot be
ignored when economies of scale are considered. In doing so, we must mention that the size of the
household may be endogenous in making housing decisions.





_ 0.41 0.56 0.21
(0.49) (0.50) (0.41)
0.45 _ 0.52 0.14
(0.50 (0.50) (0.35)
_ 0.37 0.29 0.30
(0.48) (0.46) (0.46)
0.46 _ 0.34 0.40
(0.50) (0.47) (0.39)
0.90 0.84 0.77 0.74
(0.29) (0.37) (0.42) (0.44)
0.19 0.20 0.15 0.16
(0.39) (0.40) (0.36) (0.36)
0.78 0.81 0.96 0.97
(0.42) (0.39) (0.19) (0.18)
0.61 0.59 0.42 0.46
(0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50)
_ _ 0.84 0.88
(0.68) (1.16)
289 304 495 540
(126) (160) (255) (262)
_ _ _ 0.49
(0.50)
_ _ _ 0.47
(0.50)
Budget shares:
0.20 0.21 0.23 0.25
(0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09)
0.03 0.05 0.04 0.03
(0.04) (0.08) (0.05) (0.04)
0.11 0.14 0.13 0.13
(0.09) (0.12) (0.08) (0.09)
0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10
(0.07) (0.10) (0.08) (0.07)
0.05 0.04 0.07 0.07
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
0.05 0.02 0.05 0.05
(0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05)
0.41 0.39 0.32 0.31
(0.14) (0.14) (0.11) (0.11)
Budget share (exclusive goods):
_ 0.044 0.023 0.019
(0.057) (0.026) (0.023)
0.059 _ 0.029 0.022
(0.059) (0.030) (0.025)
_ _ _ 0.022
(0.020)
0.059 0.044 0.052 0.063
(0.059) (0.057) (0.045) (0.046)
Proportion of postivie values:
Men's clothing _ 0.74 0.74 0.76
Women's clothing 0.85 _ 0.82 0.81
Child's clothing _ _ _ 0.90






Leisure goods and services
Household operations












Table 1: descriptive statistics of the sample
Age (male) (1=less than 40)
Age (female) (1=less than 40)
Education (male) (1=tertiary)
Education (female) (1=tertiary)
24scale are not the same for all goods.19 That is, economies of scale generate a wealth
e⁄ect that incites consumption of private goods (substituting away from public goods).
This mechanism is similar to what is described by Deaton and Paxson (1998).
Some rough estimates of the distribution of total expenditure among household mem-
bers can be obtained from the aggregate data on the budget shares devoted to clothing
exhibited in Table 1. If (1) the adults￿utility functions were identical, (2) the elas-
ticity of clothing with respect to total expenditure was unitary (so that the budget
shares devoted to clothing were independent of the level of scaled total expenditure)
and (3) scale economies were independent of prices (so that the translation functions
dk
i;n(z) were equal to zero), then the share received by each individual would be pro-
portionate to the household budget share devoted to clothing for each individual. For
instance, for the case of couples with children, the expenditure share of fathers would
be equal to 0:30 ’ 0:19=0:63, that of mothers to 0:35 ’ 0:22=0:63 and that of children
to 0:35 ’ 0:22=0:63 as well. The latter ￿gure seems to be larger than any realistic
measure of the cost of children. Such over-stating, however, may be partly explained
by economies of scale in the household. Expenditure on children￿ s clothing that are
purely private cannot be compressed.
To check that budget share equations are nonlinear, we perform reduced-form estima-
tions on subsamples for single-person households, two-person households, three-person
households, respectively. The budget shares for male and female clothing are ￿rst re-
gressed on the dummies for education, age, car ownership, house ownership, urban
resident and Paris resident and the log total expenditure. The squared log total ex-
penditure and the Wu-Hausman residuals are then sequentially added to the explana-
tory variables of the regression. The coe¢ cient corresponding to the main variables,
namely the log total expenditure, its squared value, and the Wu-Hausman residuals,
are presented in Table 2. For all the subsamples, the coe¢ cients of the linear model
are positive, i.e., the budget share for male and female clothing increases when total
expenditure increases (thereby implying that, on average, clothing is a luxury good).
The coe¢ cients of the quadratic model show that the e⁄ect of log total expenditure is
decreasing. The same conclusion is obtained by Banks, Blundell and Lewbel (1997).
19The e⁄ect of the household size for the other goods, that are partially private and public, is more










































Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Quadratic
Models
Table 2: Estimated coefficents of reduced-form regressions
log exp
log exp
square of log exp
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Square of log exp











26The results are consistent for all the subsamples which suggest that the budget share
equations are indeed nonlinear. Nevertheless, the coe¢ cients are not very precisely
estimated. The introduction of Wu-Hausman residuals does not modify notably the
estimates.
4.3 Estimations of the Simple Model
To begin with, we consider a three-equation model that consists in the budget share
equations for the two adult-goods and the residual good (the latter being omitted
from the estimations). In that case, the identi￿cation of the structural components
of the model is based on a limited number of information so that e¢ ciency may be
diminished. The functional form in these primary estimations is thus simpli￿ed: all the
parameters ￿i;j and ei;j are set to zero. These simpli￿cations turn out to be necessary,
as shown below, to obtain signi￿cant results.
In a preliminary step, we want to perform a test of the endogeneity of log total expen-
diture. The technique consists in directly testing exogeneity through the signi￿cance
of the ￿ Wu-Hausman￿residuals in the regressions. It appears that the residuals for
the square of log expenditure are not jointly signi￿cant; hence only the ￿ Wu-Hausman￿
residuals for log expenditure are introduced for the basic model.20 The estimated co-
e¢ cients of the budget share equations for male and female are presented in Table
3. Men and women are characterized by estimated coe¢ cients of the same sign and
the same order of magnitude. In particular, the coe¢ cients of log scaled expendi-
ture and its square are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero, suggesting that the regularity
conditions of Proposition 2 are satis￿ed; more precisely, the e⁄ect of log scaled expen-
diture on budget shares is positive but decreasing. These ￿gures are compatible with
reduced-form estimations reported in Table 2 for the sample of single persons (with
lower standard deviations). Finally, as for socio-demographic variables, the coe¢ cients
are not precisely estimated; only the coe¢ cient of the dummy variable for car owners
is signi￿cantly negative at the 5% level.
More interesting for our purpose are the estimated coe¢ cients of the sharing and scal-
20The residual for log expenditure does not turn to be essential. Only the coe¢ cient in the male
budget share equation is signi￿cant at the 10% level.
27Constant -1.099 (0.437) -0.795 (0.320)
Adult's age (1=less than 40) -0.013 (0.010) -0.014 (0.006)
Adult's education (1=tertiary) 0.004 (0.009) 0.002 (0.005)
Car owner -0.030 (0.006) -0.011 (0.005)
House owner 0.005 (0.003) 0.003 (0.003)
Urban resident -0.001 (0.003) -0.002 (0.003)
Paris resident 0.006 (0.004) 0.006 (0.003)
Log scaled exp 2.120 (0.891) 1.679 (0.659)
Log scaled exp squared -0.934 (0.459) -0.808 (0.343)
Demographic translations
Adult's age (1=less than 40) -0.002 (0.003) -0.045 (0.035)
Adult's education (1=tertiary) 0.010 (0.317) -0.039 (0.036)
Table 3: estimated coefficients of the three-equation model -
Budget share equations
Budget share for male
clothing
Budget share for female
clothing
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
ing functions that are shown in Table 4. To begin with, the coe¢ cients of the sharing
functions (in particular, those entering the child￿ s exponential function) are not pre-
cisely estimated. Nonetheless, some results deserve attention. Firstly, the wage ratio
seems to in￿ uence the distribution of resources among spouses in the household: an
increase in the wife￿ s wage relatively to the husband￿ s entails a shift of the distribu-
tion of total expenditure from the husband to the wife. The e⁄ect of this variable on
the share of total expenditure devoted to the child, on the other hand, is more am-
biguous. These results, although intuitive, must be interpreted with caution because,
as it will be shown below, their robustness is questionable. Secondly, the coe¢ cient
of the dummy variable for the child￿ s sex is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero at usual
signi￿cance levels. More precisely, it turns out that girls receive, on average, a smaller
fraction of total expenditure than boys. This result con￿rms the work of Rose (1999)
￿and Dunbar, Lewbel and Pendakur (2010) that use a technique similar to ours ￿
showing that discrimination in favor of boys may be revealed by the structure of con-
sumption.21 Our empirical results di⁄er from these studies in that they are based on
21In contrast, Deaton (1989) does not observe any discrimination between boys and girls using data
from C￿te d￿ Ivoire and Thailand.
28Translations of budget shares
Constant 0.004 (0.028) 0.001 (0.011)
Translation of log expenditure
Constant -0.583 (0.202) -0.599 (0.243)
Constant (if child) -0.449 (0.180) -0.656 (0.274)
Constant 0.000 _
Constant (if child) 0.000 _




Wage ratio 0.000 _
Constant -0.467 (0.393)
Constant (if child) -0.022 (0.398)
Man's age (1=less than 40) -0.043 (0.036)
Man's education (1=tertiary) 0.044 (0.031)
Wage ratio -0.026 (0.009)
Constant -0.463 (0.455)
Child's sex (1=girl) -0.197 (0.096)
Child's age (1=less than 2) 0.100 (0.076)
Wage ratio -0.099 (0.071)
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Variables entering child exponential function
Shares of total expenditure
Female economies of scale
Table 4: estimated coefficients of the three-equation model -
scaling and sharing functions
Male Economies of scale
Variables entering female exponential function
Variables entering male exponential function
29data from a developed country.22 Needless to say, however, the larger proportion of
household resources devoted to boys (by comparison with girls) does not necessarily
mean that the utility of the former is greater. Indeed boys and girls do not generally
bene￿t from the same level of joint consumption in the household. This result simply
says that what the parents spend for a girl is lower than what they spend for a boy.
One last point to mention when examining Table 4 is that the parameters of the
scaling functions are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from one, underlining the existence of size-
able economies of scale in the household and invalidating the traditional Rothbarth
approach.
To have a better understanding of these results, however, the estimated shares ￿i;n(z)
for a representative household, the estimated (normalized) scales ￿i;n(z), and the
estimated overall cost of the child c(z), as well as their standard error and con￿dence
interval, are reported in Table 5. The con￿dence intervals are useful because these
functions are strongly nonlinear. A ￿rst suggestive point is that the wife￿ s share
of total expenditure is larger than the husband￿ s (even if these di⁄erences are not
signi￿cant because of large standard deviations). For a representative couple without
children, the wife￿ s share amounts to about 0:62 with a standard error of 0:09. To
take a comparison point, the average wife￿ s share estimated by Browning, Chiappori
and Lewbel (2008), with Canadian data, is in excess of 0:60: Similarly, Bargain and
Donni (2010), using data from Ireland, obtain estimations that are comprised between
0:51 and 0:63. Nonetheless, Lewbel and Pendakur (2008), using Canadian data too,
obtain estimations that are notably smaller (depending on the model they consider
the average wife￿ s share varies between 0:36 and 0:46). The natural interpretation ￿
ignoring for a while that the equal sharing hypothesis cannot be statistically rejected
￿is that women have the leading voice in the household. Note that each household
budget share is the weighted average of the individual budget shares, with weights
being equal to individual shares of total expenditure. If the wife￿ s share is greater than
a half, then the behavior of couples resembles more that of single women than that of
single men. It may be the result of self-selection at the time of marriage ￿the men
22Evidence from developed countries is rare and inconclusive. For instance, Lundberg and Rose
(2004) estimate Engel curves on U.S. data and do not discern a clear phenomenon of discrimination





Wife's share of total expenditure (no
child)
0.616 0.090 0.461 0.758
Wife's share of total expenditure (one
boy)
0.387 0.073 0.271 0.512
Wife's share of total expenditure (one
girl)
0.402 0.075 0.281 0.531
Husband's share of total expenditure
(no child)
0.383 0.090 0.241 0.538
Husband's share of total expenditure
(one boy)
0.377 0.099 0.220 0.547
Husband's share of total expenditure
(one girl)
0.391 0.101 0.228 0.564
Boy's share of total expenditure 0.235 0.092 0.105 0.406
Girl's share of total expenditure 0.205 0.093 0.081 0.382
Boy's overall cost 0.036 0.052 -0.032 0.131
Girl's overall cost -0.002 0.055 -0.072 0.100
Wife's normalized economies of scale
(no child)
1.649 0.186 1.313 1.871
Wife's normalized economies of scale
(one boy)
1.792 0.096 1.623 1.936
Wife's normalized economies of scale
(one girl)
1.845 0.105 1.660 2.003
Husband's normalized economies of
scale (no child)
1.977 0.130 1.776 2.196
Husband's normalized economies of
scale (one boy)
1.830 0.123 1.636 2.020
Husband's normalized economies of
scale (one girl)
1.885 0.139 1.667 2.102
Table 5: Estimated economies of scale and shares of total







Note: The representative household is composed of adults aged under 40 without tertiary
education. If they have a child, it is a boy above 2. Wage ratio is equal to one. Standard
deviations are computed by bootstrap.
31that decide to marry have preferences more comparable to that of unmarried women
￿or changes in tastes after the marriage. One last point which is really interesting in
the results of Table 5 is that, for a representative couple with one child, the wife￿ s and
the husband￿ s shares are approximately the same. In other words, the mother seems
to bear the largest fraction of child expenditures in the household.
Now let us consider the share of total expenditure devoted to the child. For a repre-
sentative household, it amounts to about 23% of total expenditure for a boy and to
20% for a girl. Studies based on more traditional Rothbarth approaches obtain esti-
mations of expenditures for children that are usually lower: about 15% of household
total expenditure in Gronau (1991), using US data; between 11% and 18% in Deaton,
Ruiz-Castillo and Thomas (1989) with Spanish data; and between 9% and 13% in
Tsakloglou (1991) with Greek data. Our estimations are not very indicative, though,
because con￿dence intervals are large. Moreover, the "overall cost" of a child, which
is also presented in Table 5, turns out to be rather small. For instance, for a boy, it is
equal to 0:036, with an upper bound for the 95% con￿dence interval at 0:131. That is
to say, the supplement of income necessary to maintain the level of welfare of parents
after the birth of a boy is equal at most to 13% of total expenditure; and it is probably
lower. These small overall costs may be explained by important economies of scale in
the household, as we shall see.
To show this, the scales si;n(z) (not reported in tables) can be computed. If these
scales are to be interpreted as re￿ ecting joint consumption, they should, in principle,
lie between ￿i;n(z) (complete jointness of consumption) and 1:00 (purely private con-
sumption) for a childless couple. Also it turns out that the estimates of scales si;n(z)
for childless couples are reasonable in magnitude, but small. To take an example,
the women￿ s scale for a representative childless couple is equal to 0:70; so the cost of
living for a woman with a man is 70% of the cost she would experience should she live
alone. One naturally expects that economies of scales increase (i.e., de￿ ators decrease)
in families with one child compared to childless couples. Nevertheless, the magnitude
of the de￿ ators is di¢ cult to interpret as household members consume only a fraction
of total expenditure. That is why the normalized measures of scale economies ￿i;n(z)
are presented in the lower panel of Table 5. They amount to 1:98 (1:65) for a man
(woman) living in a couple without. They are of the same order for households with
32children, that is, 1:83 (1:79) when the child is a boy and 1:89 (1:84) when this is a
girl. Overall, these values are remarkably large. Indeed, let us recall that, in the limit
case where ￿i;n(z) = 2 all the goods consumed by spouses can be assimilated to purely
public goods. Hence joint consumption among households is certainly important.23
As a consequence, it can be shown that indi⁄erence scales for spouses (not reported
here) are close to one. For instance, the household income must be multiplied by no
more than 1:15 for a woman to obtain the same level of welfare in a couple with a
boy than when alone. Such woman, if living alone, would need 0:87 ￿ 1=1:15 of the
couple￿ s income to reach the same indi⁄erence curve as when in couple. This is clearly
larger than a half because single persons would not bene￿t from the important scale
economies.
4.4 Estimations of the Complete Model
The estimates obtained with the simple model, although based on quite restrictive
functional forms, are not su¢ ciently precise. Therefore we consider here a more com-
plete model including ten budget share equations and a completely general speci￿-
cation: all the parameters of the functional form discussed in Section 3.1 are now
free.
Since each additional equation generates overidentifying restrictions, the structural
components of the model are expected to be more precisely estimated in the complete
model. The Hausman-Wu residuals for log total expenditure and its square are intro-
duced in each budget share equation (except that for male and female clothing which
includes only one residual). The estimated coe¢ cients of these residuals are not re-
ported here but it turns out that the majority of them are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from
zero. Exogeneity of log total expenditure is clearly rejected by the data.
23By comparison, Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2008) obtain economies of scale (aggregated
over the household using a measure di⁄erent from ours) comprised between 1:27 and 1:41. Bargain
and Donni (2010) obtain a con￿rmation of the present measures of scale economies when using data
for Ireland. Using US data, Nelson (1989) estimates the economies of scale in the household for
each good (including housing). Her estimations are very large. In particular, economies of scale for
housing seem larger than what they would be in the case of pure joint consumption. She explains it
by increasing returns in household production
33Man Woman Man Woman Man Woman Man Woman Man Woman Man Woman Man Woman
-1.185 -4.560 1.011 3.630 -0.381 -0.822 -0.622 0.750 0.399 -2.557 0.164 1.502 3.294 3.231
(1.241) (1.391) (0.656) (0.688) (0.241) (0.365) (0.948) (1.030) (1.053) (1.310) (0.549) (0.899) (1.228) (0.994)
0.024 0.032 0.005 -0.005 0.004 0.010 0.002 -0.016 -0.030 -0.011 0.000 -0.002 0.017 0.000
(0.011) (0.008) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.010) (0.006) (0.011) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.010) (0.006)
0.000 0.021 -0.017 -0.009 0.005 0.006 0.021 0.000 0.003 0.004 0.000 -0.019 0.010 0.002
(0.008) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006)
-0.030 -0.021 -0.014 0.002 -0.027 -0.013 -0.011 0.005 0.121 0.073 -0.007 0.004 -0.020 -0.009
(0.011) (0.010) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.007) (0.012) (0.010) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
0.005 0.002 0.018 0.007 0.002 0.004 0.011 0.003 0.016 0.025 0.001 0.019 -0.007 -0.008
(0.009) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
-0.001 0.003 0.000 0.003 -0.001 -0.002 0.011 0.006 -0.008 -0.024 0.002 -0.001 0.016 0.002
(0.011) (0.010) (0.007) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
0.011 0.008 -0.018 -0.009 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.003 0.001 0.005 -0.018 -0.014 -0.009
(0.010) (0.010) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
3.124 10.376 -2.063 -7.661 0.825 1.676 1.199 -1.743 0.488 5.675 0.374 -3.756 6.876 -6.933
(2.665) (2.989) (1.442) (1.487) (0.554) (0.756) (2.062) ((2.206) (2.288) (2.801) (1.181) (1.921) (2.581) (2.141)
-1.725 -5.649 1.118 4.068 .370 -0.775 -0.469 1.093 0.123 -3.061 -0.188 2.343 3.496 3.780






Table 6: Estimated coefficients of the complete model - Budget share equations of adults
Food Vice Clothing Leisure Goods and 
Services










Wife's age  (1=less than 40) in all women's 
equations:
Wife's education (1=tertiary) in all women's equations:








Husband's age  (1=less than 40) in all men's 
equations:











0.662 0.030 0.030 -0.224 -0.321 0.704
(0.333) (0.067) (0.283) (0.348) (0.317) (0.386)
-0.267 -0.058 -0.142 -0.110 -0.078 0.285
(0.298) (0.101) (0.257) ((0.359) (0.341) (0.459)
0.344 0.318 0.309 0.765 0.852 -1.232
(2.002) (0.101) (0.257) (0.359) (0.341) (0.459)
-0.110 -0.160 -0.252 -0.477 -0.588 0.694
(0.854) (0.213) (0.884) (0.689) (0.554) (0.734)
-0.067 -0.024 0.098 -0.001 0.050 0.004
(0.421) (0.149) (0.610) (0.055) (0.315) (0.052)
0.413 -1.845
(0.526) (10.247)
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
child's age (1=less than 2) in
all child's equations:







Table 7: Estimated coefficients of the complete model - Budget







One advantage of the general model is that the hypothesis according to which the
parameters for singles and couples are the same can be tested. To do that, we construct
a more general model where the parameters bk
i and ck
i of the budget shares (others
than for male and female clothing) may be di⁄erent for singles and for persons living
in couple. We then make a NR-squared test (accounting for the heteroskedasticity
of error terms across goods). The number of restrictions is equal to 24 (i.e., four
restrictions per equation). The R2 of the auxiliary regression amounts to 0.0025 and
the total number of observations to 16,600 (i.e., the number of households in the
sample multiplied by the number of goods). The NR-squared statistic, which follows
a Chi-squared distribution under the null hypothesis, is then equal to 41.50 with 24
degrees of freedom. The null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% level, but not at the 1%
level. In view of the large number of observations, supposing that the parameters for
single persons and for persons living in couple are the same seems to be a reasonable
approximation. This preliminary step allows us to go further in the analysis.
The general speci￿cation has, all in all, 251 parameters (out of which 98 are signi￿-
34cantly di⁄erent from zero at the 10% level). The estimated parameters of the male and
female budget share equations are reported in Table 6. Some comments are in order.
Firstly, the estimated parameters of the budget share equations for male and female
clothing are of the same order as those obtained with the simple model (reported in
Table 3), but standard deviations are generally lower. Going one step further, it turns
out that, for all the budget share equations, the estimated parameters are similar to
those obtained from the sample of single-person households.24 Secondly, the e⁄ect of
the socio-demographic variables for men and women are consistent between them. In
particular, several dummies have the same signi￿cant e⁄ect on budget share for both
men and women: the dummy for age has a positive e⁄ect on the food budget shares;
the dummy for education has a negative e⁄ect on the vice budget shares; the dummy
for car owners has a negative e⁄ect on the food budget shares, on the male and fe-
male clothing budget shares, and a positive e⁄ect on the transport budget shares; the
dummy for Paris resident has a negative e⁄ect on the vice budget shares; the dummy
for house owner has a positive e⁄ect on the transport budget shares and on the vice
budget shares. The estimated parameters of the child￿ s budget share equations are
presented in Table 7 but are unfortunately not precisely estimated. The slopes of the
child￿ s budget shares with respect to log total expenditure do not allow inferring the
nature of goods (luxury or necessary) even though this information is identi￿able, as
explained in the theoretical section.
The estimates of the coe¢ cients of the sharing and scaling functions are reported in
Table 8. Regarding the distribution of resources between adults, the ￿rst stable result
is that living with an older partner reduces the share of total expenditure that a person
receives. It seems also that the level of education of the wife has a negative e⁄ect on her
share, but this e⁄ect is not very signi￿cant. The distribution factor, i.e., the wage ratio,
does not signi￿cantly in￿ uence the intrahousehold distribution of resources, contrary
to what was observed with the simple model. The sign of the estimated coe¢ cient in
both models is, however, the same.25 One possible explanation is that the signi￿cant
24To save on space, the estimates obtained with the sample of single-persons are not reported here.
25Whether she works or not may be the margin that matters in this respect, more than di⁄erences
in productivities. As explained before, we focus here on two-earner couples and do not have variation
in female labor market participation; see Zamora (2008) on this issue.
35Translations of budget shares (constants)
food -0.554 (0.365) 0.517 (0.297)
vice 0.038 (0.049) 0.026 (0.040)
clothing 0.032 (0.014) 0.001 (0.007)
leisure goods and
services
-0.078 (0.267) 0.125 (0.228)
transport 0.319 (0.299) -0.294 (0.254)
Personal goods and
services
0.291 (0.227) -0.202 (0.185)
Household operations -0.765 (0.324) 0.728 (0.237)
Translation of log expenditure
Constant -0.528 (0.120) -0.633 (0.144)
Constant (if child) -0.940 (0.149) -0.725 (0.197)
Adult's age
-0.005 (0.012) -0.021 (0.016)
Adult's education
-0.029 (0.016) 0.014 (0.013)
Variables entering female exponential function
Constant 0.000 _






Wage ratio 0.000 _
Variables entering male exponential function
Constant 0.217 (0.261)
Constant (if child) 0.047 0.285






Wage ratio -0.004 (0.005)
Variables entering child exponential function
Constant -0.354 (0.280)
Child's sex (1=girl) -0.200 (0.073)
Child's age (1=less than 2) 0.040 (0.053)
Wage ratio 0.006 (0.007)
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Male Economies of scale Female economies of scale
Shares of total expenditure






Wife's share of total expenditure (no
child)
0.554 0.063 0.447 0.657
Husband's share of total expenditure
(no child)
0.445 0.063 0.342 0.552
Wife's share of total expenditure (one
boy)
0.358 0.050 0.277 0.443
Husband's share of total expenditure
(one boy)
0.375 0.065 0.271 0.487
Boy's share of total expenditure 0.265 0.053 0.183 0.360
Wife's share of total expenditure (one
girl)
0.375 0.052 0.291 0.464
Husband's share of total expenditure
(one girl)
0.394 0.069 0.283 0.511
Girl's share of total expenditure 0.230 0.056 0.146 0.330
Boy's overall cost 0.053 0.027 0.012 0.100
Girl's overall cost 0.004 0.026 -0.034 0.051
Wife's normalized economies of scale
(no child)
1.847 0.060 1.739 1.925
Wife's normalized economies of scale
(one boy)
1.854 0.047 1.770 1.925
Wife's normalized economies of scale
(one girl)
1.921 0.051 1.832 1.997
Husband's normalized economies of
scale (no child)
1.693 0.089 1.545 1.837
Husband's normalized economies of
scale (one boy)
1.619 0.103 1.440 1.775
Husband's normalized economies of
scale (one girl)
1.669 0.108 1.482 1.831
Table 9: Estimated economies of scale and shares of total






Note: The representative household is composed of adults aged under 40 without tertiary
education. If they have a child, it is a boy above 2. Wage ratio is equal to one. Standard
deviations are computed by bootstrap.
37e⁄ect observed in the budget share equations for clothing is due to the endogeneity
of wages. Indeed, if higher-paid jobs require more expensive work clothing, then the
incomes of the wife and husband will enter the budget share equations even if we
condition on individual shares. Finally, concerning the expenditure devoted to the
child, it appears that boys are favored over girls. This con￿rms the conclusion drawn
with the simple model.
The estimated shares of total expenditure for a representative household, the esti-
mated (normalized) scales, and the estimated overall cost of the child, as well as their
standard error and their con￿dence interval, are reported in Table 9. Overall, the
results obtained with the simple model are con￿rmed, but the standard deviations are
lower. First, the estimations of the shares of total expenditure are comparable to those
previously obtained. In particular, the average share devoted to the child amounts to
0:27 for a boy and 0:23 for a girl. Second, the overall cost of a boy is around 5%
of household total expenditure while the overall cost of a girl is close to zero. Again
these values seem to be very small. Third, the estimation of the normalized measures of
scale economies con￿rm that joint consumption is important. For a man and a woman
living in a childless couple, the normalized measures are 1:694 and 1:848 respectively.
They are of 1:619 and 1:854 if the husband and the wife have one boy and of 1:669
and 1:921 if they have a girl. To summarize, the estimations of the main structural
components are similar to those obtained with the simple model in spite of the fact
that these two models are based on quite di⁄erent sets of maintained assumptions.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have suggested a new method to estimate the cost of children that
generalizes the more conventional Rothbarth method. This approach is consistent with
the existence of economies of scale and parental bargaining. Our empirical results on
French data indicate that the parents￿expenditures made for children living in the
household are relatively important. They amount to about 23 ￿ 27% of household
total expenditure. Nevertheless, the economies of scale in multi-person households
turn out to be very large as well, so that the income necessary to compensate parents
after the birth of a ￿rst child is after all very modest. In fact the estimations of
38this alternative measure of the cost of a child which takes into account economies
of scale are unexpectedly small ￿around 5% of household total expenditure. This
result certainly needs more scrutiny in future research. Another important empirical
contribution of this paper is that expenditures made by parents for boys seem to
be larger than for girls, suggesting the existence of some discrimination within the
household (even if other explanations for this result can be envisaged). This is one of
the rare contributions that underlines this phenomenon in a developed country.
Future research should generalize the approach suggested in this paper. In particular,
the cost of children is measured only for families with a single child. It is necessary to
consider more diversi￿ed demographic structures in order to measure how the overall
cost of children changes when the size of the household increases. Moreover, the time
devoted by parents to child care certainly represents a signi￿cant fraction of non-
market time. It should be incorporated in our model. In particular, the mothers￿
part-time participation in the labor market, which is generally associated with the
provision of child care, should be modeled to de￿ne a more complete concept of the
cost of children.
Appendix: Further Identi￿cation Results
The model is largely overidenti￿ed as it will be clear below. Overidenti￿cation could, in
principle, be used to relax some of the controversial postulate upon which the model is
based. One of the most restrictive of them is the assumption that the sharing functions
are independent of log total expenditure x. To show how we can get it without such
a constraint, we have ￿rst to understand why the model is overidenti￿ed. Let us take
the expenditure share equation for one adult speci￿c good ki for the case of childless
couples and suppose that socio-demographic variables are constant z = ￿ z, that is,
W
ki








x + ￿i;2(￿ z) ￿ logsi;2(￿ z); ￿ zi
￿￿
; (21)
where i = 1 or 2, d
ki
i;2(￿ z), ￿i;2(￿ z) and si;2(￿ z) are constants and W
ki
2 (￿; ￿ z) and w
ki
i (￿; ￿ zi)
are one-variable functions. The latter functions are supposed to be observed (i.e.,
estimated from data) as is explained in the main text. Therefore, when x varies
within its domain, expression (21) can be seen as a continuum of equations in dk
i;2(￿ z),
39￿i;2(￿ z) and si;2(￿ z) for any value of ￿ z. To be more concrete, let us consider three
arbitrary values of log total expenditure, i.e., fx1;x2;x3g. This provides a system of
three equations in three unknowns:
W
k








xT + ￿i;2(￿ z) ￿ logsi;2(￿ z); ￿ zi
￿￿
;
where T = 1;2;3, that can, in general, be solved. Hence, the functions dk
i;2(￿ z), ￿i;2(z)
and si;2(z) are generically identi￿ed for any value of the vector ￿ z. The same reasoning
applies in the case of couples with children, thereby showing that children￿ s cost is
identi￿ed. Note that this result is only generic in the sense that it is ￿ almost always￿
satis￿ed in the traditional mathematical sense. However it may be violated for par-
ticular forms of preferences. For instance, it is clear that the structural components
are not identi￿able if the budget share equation for good k is linear in its ￿rst argu-
ment. This explains the regularity conditions that are used in Proposition 2. Finally,
since only three values fx1;x2;x3g of log total expenditure are, in principle, su¢ cient
for identifying the main structural components, the model is largely over-identi￿ed.
From the previous reasoning, one can straightforwardly conclude that the structural
components of the model are still identi￿ed when there is only one adult-speci￿c good,
that is, a good which is not speci￿c to the wife or the husband. Indeed, the budget
share equation for the adult-speci￿c good in a household of type n can be written as:
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k

















i=1 ￿i;n(￿ z) ￿ dk
i;n(￿ z). This represents a continuum of equations in
Dk
i;n(￿ z), ￿1;n(￿ z), ￿2;n(￿ z), s1;n(￿ z) and s2;n(￿ z) for any value of ￿ z. Nonetheless, even
if identi￿cation is theoretically possible, it may be very di¢ cult to estimate these
constants with any precision from real data.
Let us come back to the initial case of two adult-speci￿c goods and consider a gener-
alization of the model where ￿i;n = ￿i;n(x; ￿ z). In that case, the budget share equations
for adult-speci￿c goods become:
W
ki








x + ￿i;n(x; ￿ z) ￿ logsi;n(￿ z); ￿ zi
￿￿
;
40with i = 1 or 2. Then inverting this equation with respect to ￿i;n(x; ￿ z) (under the
assumption that such an inversion is possible) gives:






n (x; ￿ z);d
ki





i;n(￿) is a known function. That is to say, each sharing function ￿i;n(x; ￿ z) is
identi￿ed up to two constants d
ki
i;n(￿ z) and si;n(￿ z), with i = 1;2. To obtain a complete
identi￿cation, additional information is necessary. For instance, let us suppose that
we have at our disposal an additional adult-speci￿c good k0, that is,
W
k0
n (x; ￿ z) =
2 X
i=1








x + ￿i;n(x; ￿ z) ￿ logsi;n(￿ z); ￿ zi
￿￿
: (24)









2;n(￿ z), s1;n(￿ z) and s2;n(￿ z) for any value of ￿ z. Again, if this continuum of
equations is solved for any value of ￿ z, the functions ￿1;n(x;z) and ￿2;n(x;z) can be
generically identi￿ed.
Finally, using the same reasoning, it would be possible to show that, with a su¢ ciently
large system of budget share equations and with adult-speci￿c goods, the structural
components of the model are generically identi￿ed in the more general case where
the scaling functions can be written as si;n = si;n(x;z), provided that the elasticities
dk
i;n(z), for k = 1;:::;K, are independent of x.
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